#venture-capital

VideoArticle Title/ Author(s)/Managerial Abstract
Alvarez-Garrido and Dushnitsky: Investor complementary assets | SMJ Video AbstractAre Entrepreneurial Venture’s Innovation Rates Sensitive to Investor Complementary Assets? Comparing Biotech Ventures Backed by Corporate and Independent VCs
Dushnitsky,Gary; Elisa Alvarez-Garrido
Entrepreneurial ventures are a key source of innovation. Nowadays, ventures are backed by a wide array of investors whose complementary asset profiles differ significantly. We therefore assert that entrepreneurial ventures can no longer be studied as a homogeneous group. Rather, we harness the inherent dichotomy in the profiles of independent VCs and corporate investors to study ventures' innovation outcomes. Our sample consists of 545 U.S. biotechnology ventures founded between 1990 and 2003 and backed by independent venture capitalists (VCs ) or corporate VCs (CVC ). We find CVCs ' investees exhibit higher rates of innovation output, compared to independent VC ‐backed peers. Moreover, the performance of CVC ‐backed ventures is sensitive to their ability to leverage corporate assets, underscoring the role of CVC accessibility and FDA approval requirements as the mechanisms associated with CVC contribution .
Venture capital exit pressure and venture exit: A board perspective | SMJ Video AbstractVenture capital exit pressure and venture exit:A board perspective
Ting Yao; Hugh O'Neill
Venture capital funds have alimited lifecycle. As the fund ages, venture capitalists(VCs) are motivated to promote venture exit discus-sions with the venture board. We investigate the impactof VCs' exit pressure on the hazard of four types of ven-ture exit (IPO, high-value M&A, low-value M&A, andliquidation), considering how VCs' exit pressure influ-ences board collaboration. We find that while the VCs'exit pressure does not affect the hazard of IPOs, thepressure significantly increases the hazard of M&A andliquidation. Achieving important milestones does notreduce the impact of exit pressure on the hazard oflow-value M&A and liquidation. Independent directorsmoderate the impact of the VC's exit pressure, increas-ing the hazard of high-value M&A and lessening thehazard of liquidation